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One approach to knowledge, termed the relevant alternatives theory, stip-
ulates that a belief amounts to knowledge if one can eliminate all relevant
alternatives to the belief in the epistemic situation. This paper uses causal
graphical models to formalize the relevant alternatives approach to knowl-
edge. On this theory, an epistemic situation is encoded through the causal
relationships between propositions, which determine which alternatives are
relevant and irrelevant. This formalization entails that statistical evidence is
not sufficient for knowledge, provides a simple way to incorporate epistemic
contextualism, and can rule out many Gettier cases from knowledge. The
interpretation in terms of causal models offers more precise predictions for
the relevant alternatives theory, strengthening the case for it as a theory of
knowledge.
A popular approach to discerning knowledge from mere belief requires ruling
out possible alternatives which could interfere with the truth of a belief. This
approach was dominant in the historical tradition interested in scientific knowl-
edge (episteme or scientia), where knowledge required showing that one’s judg-
ment was completely free from error. Aristotle accomplished this by restricting
knowledge to deductive consequences of basic definitions, i.e., that the angles of a
triangle are equal to two right angles. Working towards the same goal, Descartes
attempted to prove impossible all competing alternatives to his beliefs, refuting
even far-fetched skepticism-inducing hypotheses like the evil demon hypothesis,
where an evil demon deceptively leads him to form false beliefs.
A version of this approach has also been developed as an ordinary language
theory of knowledge in the late twentieth century (Dretske, 1970; Goldman, 1976;
Lewis, 1996). On this approach, what separates knowledge from mere belief is
the fact that one can rule out all of the relevant alternatives to a given belief. In
contrast to historical theories of scientific knowledge, only the relevant alternatives
need to be ruled out, rather than all possible alternatives. This leaves a much
greater range of beliefs open to knowledge, including beliefs justified by processes
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like perception, testimony, and memory. The challenge, of course, is to determine
which alternatives are relevant or irrelevant in a given situation.
For one version of the relevant alternatives theory, Lewis (1996) offers a set
of rules for determining whether an alternative is relevant. Smith (2010, 2017),
developing a version of the relevant alternatives theory for justification, argues
that the salient criterion for determining whether an alternative can be ruled out is
whether it conflicts with ceteris paribus laws rather than being merely improbable.
Sosa (1999) argues for a counterfactual theory of knowledge, where the relevant
alternatives are given by the most similar worlds to the actual world.1 These
theories are motivated by the desire to explain certain properties of knowledge,
such as the fact that statistical evidence is insufficient for knowledge (Smith,
2017), the fact that knowledge judgments appear to shift based on context (Lewis,
1996), and the fact that Gettier cases are intuitively excluded from knowledge
(Sosa, 1999). However, critics of the relevant alternatives approach argue that not
enough work has been done to make the relevant-irrelevant distinction precise, a
criticism found, for example, in Anderson’s (2017) review of Smith (2017) and
Williamson’s (2009) criticism of Sosa’s safety criterion for knowledge.
This paper uses the theory of causal models, which encode the structural rela-
tionships between variables and the errors associated with these relationships, to
develop a formal model of the relevant alternatives theory. This model captures
many of the intuitions of previous approaches to the relevant alternative theory
with the advantage of a unified formal framework. §1 begins by discussing how the
relevant alternatives theory can discriminate knowledge from mere belief, inter-
preting a standard example through the terminology of causal models. §2 formally
defines causal models and introduces the causal version of the relevant alterna-
tives theory of knowledge. §3 shows how statistical evidence factors into causal
models and argues that statistical evidence is insufficient for knowledge within the
causal relevant alternatives theory. §4 discusses epistemic contextualism, showing
how the contextualist thesis can naturally be formulated in terms of a shift in
causal models. §5 shows how the theory excludes Gettier cases from knowledge.
Finally, §6 discusses some applications of the relevant alternatives theory beyond
knowledge, addressing possible theories of justification and full belief using the
relevant alternatives theory.
1 The Relevant Alternatives Theory
Following an example from Dretske (1970), suppose you are going to a zoo and
are interested in seeing a zebra. When approaching the zoo, you see that the first
parking lot is blocked off so that no one can enter. Based on this evidence, would
1The relationship between counterfactual theories of knowledge and the relevant alternatives
theory is discussed in more detail in Holliday (2015) and in §5.
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you be justified in concluding that the zoo is closed? And, if the zoo does turn out
to be closed, would this conclusion amount to knowledge? The answer to these
questions is likely no: the closed parking lot is pretty weak evidence supporting
that the zoo is closed and we can easily imagine many situations in which the
parking lot is closed, but the zoo is still open: the parking lot could be closed for
construction or the zoo could be utilizing other parking lots for the day.
Now suppose you have found out that the zoo is open and have entered the
zoo, and you come across an enclosure labeled as the zebra enclosure filled with
animals that look like zebras. In this case, it seems clearly justified to believe
that the zoo has zebras, and provided that this is correct, the belief seems to
amount to knowledge. However, it is also known that perception is not infallible,
so it is still possible that some highly unusual occurrence means that the animals
identified as zebras are not in fact zebras. For Dretske, the concern is that the
zookeepers have cleverly disguised some mules to look like zebras, but one could
just as well be concerned about hallucinations, holograms, etc.
The relevant alternatives theory argues that, in the first case, the alternative
situations are relevant, while in the latter case, they are not. In the first case, there
are many salient explanations for why the zoo would have a closed parking lot,
even though the zoo is open. Because these alternative explanations are salient
and not improbable, this belief falls short of knowledge. In the second case, on
the other hand, the possible errors involved (hallucinations, disguises, etc.) are
comparatively improbable and are unlikely to even come to mind in the situation,
so we are perfectly justified in ignoring them as competing explanations.
Both examples involve an agent with a body of evidence interested in whether
they can know that a target proposition is true. Both epistemic situations can
also be thought of as being structured by the causal relations between variables
of interest. In the first case, the agent is interested in whether the zoo is open,
which has a causal effect on the closed parking lot, the observation of which is
part of the agent’s body of evidence. In the second case, the agent is interested
in the presence of a zebra at the zoo, which has a causal effect on the perceptual
experience of seeing a zebra, which is part of the agent’s evidence.2 We can struc-
ture the possible alternatives of the situation around the causal representation:
the alternatives are represented by other possible causes of the zoo being closed
or other possible causes of the appearance of a zebra.
We can make this causal representation more precise using the terminology of
causal models. Causal models simply consist of a set of variables and structural
relationships between these variables. For example, in the case of perceiving a
zebra, we can think of both the presence of a zebra and the appearance of a zebra
as binary variables in the model which can be either true or false. As discussed
2Note that this resembles the causal theory of perception (Grice and White, 1961), where a
state of affairs or object p causes the perceptual appearance of p.
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above, we can think of the presence of a zebra as having a causal effect on the
appearance of a zebra. We can represent this causal relationship graphically,




We can also describe this causal relationship in terms of a structural equation. If
we represent the presence of a zebra with the binary variable Z and the appearance
of a zebra with the binary variable A, we can describe the causal relationship with
the structural equation A = Z, which says that whether there appears to be a
zebra is completely determined by whether there is a zebra.
This model, however, is simplified so as to ignore the potential errors associ-
ated with perception. The possibility of error means that, in general, the struc-
tural equation A = Z does not hold. First of all, there are errors which inhibit the
causal relationship: if the observer is blind, for example, the presence of a zebra
will not cause the perceptual appearance of a zebra. Second, there are possible
causes of the appearance of a zebra other than a zebra being present: these in-
clude the examples mentioned before, such as the presence of a cleverly disguised
mule or a hallucination. A complete version of the structural equation would in-
corporate these possible errors through error variables. For a binary variable A,
causal models typically incorporate two kinds of error variables: the error term UA
represents ‘triggering abnormalities,’ or possible causes of A otherwise excluded
from the model, and the error term U ′A represents ‘inhibiting abnormalities,’ or
possible factors which prevent A from being realized.3 Thus, a more accurate
structural equation for the causal relationship is given by A = (Z ∧ ¬U ′A) ∨ UA:
A results when either (1) Z is present and nothing prevents Z from causing A or
(2) some other cause leads to A.4
Representing the epistemic situation in this way clarifies the assumptions that
go into drawing a conclusion. When someone concludes Z from A, that there are
zebras from the appearance of zebras, they assume that the error terms UA and
U ′A are negligible, representing the situation with the more simplistic equation
A = Z which leaves out the error terms. The next section will introduce a theory
of when such error terms are treated as negligible in a causal model, arguing that
3This discussion of error variables in causal models with binary variables follows Pearl (2009,
p. 29).
4Note that these error terms are completely unspecified and can include any possible errors.
This can escape recent criticisms of the relevant alternatives account, such as that of Bricker
(2019), who argues that, because the errors involved in perception can be ‘stochastic’ or random,
they are non-negligible. On the account here, even stochastic errors can be negligible.
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possible errors are negligible when (1) they are very unlikely and (2) they are
not obtained in the actual world. We can see that treating the possible errors
as negligible makes sense intuitively in the case of perception: it is much less
likely that some other cause UA leads to the appearance of a zebra than that
the appearance of a zebra comes from a zebra itself, so UA is very unlikely and
can be ignored. Furthermore, since the appearance of a zebra (A) is realized, the
likelihood of something inhibiting the appearance of a zebra (U ′A) is very low, so
the inhibitory factors U ′A are also irrelevant. Provided condition (2) is met, which
guarantees that the inference of Z from A is accurate, the relevant alternatives
account predicts that this belief amounts to knowledge.
We can compare this to the companion case of inferring that the zoo is closed
based on a closed parking lot. In this case, the causal relationship is the same: if
P represents a closed parking lot and C represents a closed zoo, there is a causal
influence of C on P and the relevant structural equation is P = (C ∧¬U ′P )∨UP :
the parking lot is closed when (1) the zoo is closed and nothing inhibits the
additional closure of the parking lot or (2) when some other cause leads to the
closure of the parking lot. In comparison to the previous case, it is much more
likely that the parking lot is closed for some reason other than that the zoo is
closed (UP ), so the error term UP is relevant, and therefore not negligible, in
the model. This means that concluding C on the basis of P cannot amount to
knowledge on the relevant alternatives theory since the activation of UP defines a
relevant alternative consistent with the evidence which blocks the conclusion.
On the causal interpretation of the relevant alternatives theory, the causal
representation of the epistemic situation specifies the set of possible alternatives
and aids in judging which alternatives are relevant and irrelevant. At this point, it
is natural to wonder how many epistemic situations can be incorporated into this
framework, especially since many conclusions appear to follow from non-causal
considerations. However, causal modeling does not require a causal relationship
to hold universally; typically, it is sufficient for there to be some (even minor)
causal influence upon intervention. Many classic cases of epistemology fit well in
the causal framework: perception of p is a causal result of p, memory of p stems
causally from p, and testimony that p is a causal result of p (provided the speaker
is reliably connected to the facts, as when the scientific community reports on a
matter of science). Furthermore, inference to the best explanation proceeds by
ruling out competing explanations which can often be represented as alternative
possible causes or alternative effects.
However, some cases of knowledge may be more difficult to incorporate in the
causal framework. Mathematical propositions, for example, are not often thought
of as having causal relations to each other. In this case, it may be possible to
retain the causal framework if we replace causal relations by some kind of pseudo-
causal directed relation, like grounding or dependency. Furthermore, it is not
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straightforward to incorporate knowledge of non-factual or modal propositions in
this framework, such as ‘Possibly A’ or ‘If A, then B.’ For the sake of this paper,
I ignore these difficulties and focus on more standard epistemic situations which
are easier to incorporate within the causal modeling framework.
2 Causal Models, Propositions and Knowledge
Before giving a more formal characterization of the relevant alternatives theory
of knowledge within causal models, it will be useful to discuss the components of
a causal model in greater depth. We have already introduced the notions of error
variables, structural equations, and causal graphs, but another key component
of causal models is the distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables.
Exogenous variables are those which are determined outside of the model, while
endogenous variables are determined by the exogenous variables. All error vari-
ables are exogenous, since we include no theory as to when or why they arise in
the model, and the dependent variables, such as whether there is the perceptual
appearance of a zebra, are endogenous in the model.
Causal models also include a set of independent variables. Unlike the depen-
dent variables, these are determined exogenously, outside of the model. In the
examples in the previous section, the closure of the zoo and the presence of a ze-
bra at the zoo are the independent variables. They are determined by factors not
theorized about at all in the model, such as decisions made by the officials at the
zoo. However, unlike error variables, these are often variables of interest which are
estimated and which factor into propositions. Error variables, for instance, are
usually suppressed in causal graphs, while the independent variables are included
in the graph. Typically, an independent variable is encoded as an endogenous
variable which is determined exogenously. If Z represents the variable of zebra
presence at the zoo, then Z itself is an endogenous variable which appears in the
causal graph, but we typically include a separate exogenous variable UZ which
completely determines Z, so that the structural equation for the endogenous vari-
able Z is Z = UZ . In this way, the independent variable Z is represented by both
an exogenous variable UZ and an endogenous variable Z.
A causal model, written M = (U, V, fi), therefore consists of three compo-
nents: a set of exogenous variables U , a set of endogenous variables V , and for
each endogenous variable Vi, a structural equation fi determining the value of Vi
given the parents of Vi, PAi, and the set of relevant exogenous variables, Ui. For
each variable Vi, the set of parents PAi is a subset of the other endogenous vari-
ables. The assignment of parents to endogenous variables forms a causal graph,
which is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G, where an arrow is drawn from Vi to
Vj if Vi is a parent of Vj .




and two endogenous variables (Z,A). The structural equation for Z is Z = UZ
and the structural equation for A is A = (Z∧¬U ′A)∨UA. Since Z does not depend
on any endogenous variables and A depends on Z, we see that the causal graph
is as described in the previous section:
Z
A.
An assignment of values to all of the exogenous variables, u ∈ U , completely
determines the values of all the endogenous variables in the model. This is because
the endogenous variables are all determined by structural equations which depend
on just a variable’s parents and the exogenous variables, and the endogenous vari-
ables without parents (the independent variables) depend only on the exogenous
variables. If we assume there are n endogenous variables, V = (V1, ..., Vn), then
the corresponding set of structural equations F = (f1, ..., fn) provides a map-
ping from exogenous variable assignments to endogenous variable assignments,
F : U → V . In the case of perceiving a zebra, for example, the exogenous variable
assignment (UZ , U
′
A, UA) = (1, 1, 0) determines that Z = 1 and A = 0: there is a
zebra, but it is not seen, and nothing else causes the perceptual appearance of a
zebra.
Since the different possible assignments to the exogenous variables encode the
different outcomes of the causal model, the set of exogenous variables U serves
as the set of possible situations described by the model. We can think of this
as a coarse-grained representation of the set of possible worlds. These worlds, or
exogenous variable assignments, serve as truthmakers for propositions expressed
in the causal model. The propositions we are interested in are assignments to
endogenous variables. In the perception case, propositions include ‘There is a
zebra at the zoo’ and ‘There (perceptually) appears to be a zebra.’ Propositions of
endogenous variable assignments correspond to sets of possible worlds through the
structural equations: the proposition ‘Variable Vi takes value vi’ can be associated
with the set of exogenous variables u ∈ U which make Vi = vi true: [Vi = vi] =
{u ∈ U : F (u)i = vi}. This also extends to logical combinations of variable
assignments: since variable assignments [Vi = vi] are subsets of U , negations,
conjunctions, and disjunctions of variable assignments also correspond to sets of
possible worlds through set-theoretic complementation, intersection, and union,
respectively. We require that the proposition p corresponds to a proposition in
the model: in the examples from the previous section, the proposition of interest
specifies certain values of the endogenous variables, which then correspond to a
set of possible exogenous variable assignments.
The last ingredient we need before discussing the notion of knowledge for-
mally is a way to quantify the likelihoods of different error terms. As discussed
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in the first section, some error values are relatively unlikely, and therefore neg-
ligible in the model, whereas others are more likely and not negligible. This
is accomplished through a probability distribution Pr over the set of exogenous
variable assignments U which assigns a likelihood between 0 and 1 for how likely
a given combination of variables is. This means that, for each variable assign-
ment u ∈ U , we have a number Pr(u) ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
u∈U Pr(u) = 1. For
sets of possible assignments, we calculate the probability of the set by adding to-
gether the probability of each element of the set. For example, if we want to find
the probability that exogenous variable Ui takes on value ui, we would calculate
Pr(Ui = ui) =
∑
u∈{u′:u′i=ui}
Pr(u), summing over all worlds which satisfy the
condition Ui = ui.
To formalize a causal version of the relevant alternatives theory, we assume
that the epistemic situation can be described as a causal model M = (U, V, fi),
with the set of exogenous variables U describing the set of all possible alterna-
tives. This model includes all error terms, including alternatives which we will
later want to deem irrelevant, like the ‘triggering abnormalities’ of disguises and
hallucinations in the perception case. We also assume that there is a probability
distribution Pr over U describing the relative likelihoods of each possible alter-
native. At this point, we ignore all difficulties about whether this formalization
is subjective or objective: we assume that the causal model and the probability
distribution both represent a plausible formalization of the agent’s subjective rep-
resentation of the situation as well as a factual representation of the situation in
reality.5 When there is a body of evidence E relevant to the situation, we assume
that the relevant probability distribution is the conditional distribution Pr(−|E),
where the likelihood of an outcome u ∈ U is given by the conditional probability
Pr(u|E) = Pr(u∧E)Pr(E) .
To develop a causal version of the relevant alternatives theory, we need a
method for restricting the set of all possible alternatives U to a smaller set of rel-
evant alternatives U ′ ⊆ U . We accomplish this by arguing that some of the error
values in a causal model are irrelevant. Specifically, I argue that we can ignore
all error terms in a causal model which are both sufficiently improbable and not
realized in the actual world. These error terms represent unlikely and unrealized
deviations from how variables in the model normally behave. The remaining rele-
vant possibilities are specified by the possible values for the independent variables
not ruled out by the evidence and the error terms which either obtain or are too
frequent to ignore.
We can formally describe this set of relevant possibilities through a ‘normal-
ized’ causal modelM′ = (U ′, V, f ′i), where the negligible error terms are removed
5This assumption rules out many cases where an agent’s beliefs deviate from true beliefs
in interesting ways. However, such cases are unlikely to qualify as knowledge. This issue will
be discussed in greater depth in relation to epistemic contextualism (§4) and the notions of
justification and full belief (§6).
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from the model, leaving a smaller set of possible worlds U ′ ⊆ U and a set of
structural equations f ′i which leave out some of the possible errors in the struc-
tural relationships of the model. Given a world w, which is just an assignment to
exogenous variables U , we form M′ from M by removing an error term Ui = ui
from M when (i) the error term Ui = ui is below some probability cutoff π, so
Pr(Ui = ui|E) < π, and (ii) the error term Ui = ui is not activated in the actual
world, so wi 6= ui. Note that we only ignore the error terms which factor into the
structural relationships of the model, and not the independent variables, which
represent variables of interest rather than possible deviations from what is nor-
mal or expected. We can then use M′ to define a relevant alternatives theory of
knowledge: an agent knows p in world w if p is true in all worlds in M′, which
is the set of relevant alternatives to w given evidence E and the complete causal
model M.6
To see that this formalization of the relevant alternatives theory offers a plau-
sible model of knowledge, we show that it can capture the intuitions for the two
cases in the previous section. Recall the case of perceiving a zebra: an agent
witnesses the appearance of a zebra, A, which is causally related to the presence
of a zebra by the structural equation A = (Z ∧ ¬U ′A) ∨ UA, where UA represents
causes of A other than Z and U ′A represents factors inhibiting A given Z. The
world we are typically interested in is (UZ ,¬UA,¬U ′A), where there is a zebra
which is perceived and there is no other cause of a zebra appearance. In this
case, an agent with evidence A can know Z: conditional on the appearance of a
zebra, A, the likelihood that A results from something other than a zebra, UA,
and the likelihood that A is inhibited, U ′A, are very low and not activated in the
actual world, so they can be ignored as irrelevant. To form the normalized model,
the agent removes the error terms UA and U
′
A as relevant alternatives, acting
as if the structural equation for the situation is A = Z. Note how the relevant
alternatives depend on the actual world: if the world is (¬UZ , UA,¬U ′A), so the
zebra appearance is caused by something other than a zebra, then UA cannot be
deemed irrelevant, so Z cannot amount to knowledge; this makes sense given that
Z is false in the world. Similarly, if the world is (UZ , UA, U
′
A), then neither UA
nor U ′A are negligible: while Z is true in this world and the error terms are all low
probability given the evidence, they cannot be ignored since they are activated
in the actual world. This represents a Gettier case, where Z is both true and
justified, but is not known, which will be discussed in greater depth in §5.
We can contrast this with the case of the closed parking lot, where P represents
the closed parking lot, C represents the closed zoo, and we have the structural
equation P = (C ∧ ¬U ′P ) ∨ UP . In the world (UC ,¬UP ,¬U ′P ), where the parking
6Note that this represents just one way of formalizing the relevant alternatives theory using
causal models. In the terminology of Holliday (2015), this is an example of the L-semantics,
following the approach of Lewis. One could also use causal models to formulate a different
approach, such as the D-semantics of Dretske. This will be discussed briefly in §4.
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lot is closed because the zoo is closed, an agent’s belief in C on the basis of P
does not amount to knowledge. This is because the alternatives described by
the error terms, even though they are not realized in the actual world, represent
relevant possibilities with likelihoods above reasonable choices for the cutoff π.
The likelihood of UP , that the parking lot is closed for a reason other than the
zoo being closed, is high enough to not be negligible in the epistemic situation.
Thus, the causal formulation predicts, as expected, that beliefs cannot amount to
knowledge when relevant alternatives are too significant to be ruled out.
3 Knowledge and Statistical Evidence
One fact about knowledge we expect a relevant alternatives theory to explain is
why statistical evidence is insufficient for knowledge. Evidence for the weakness
of statistical evidence comes from empirical work in law and psychology: jurors,
for example, have been shown to be less likely to draw a conclusion based on
statistical evidence than based on direct evidence (Wells, 1992; Niedermeier et al.,
1999; Heller, 2006) In philosophy, the weakness of statistical evidence arises in the
lottery case: for any given lottery ticket, there is very strong statistical evidence
that the ticket will lose, but most people agree that one cannot know that a given
ticket will lose on the basis of this statistical evidence.7
The relevant alternatives theory should be able to explain why statistical ev-
idence is not sufficient for knowledge. This is because statistical evidence leaves
open certain relevant or salient possibilities which we have no reason to eliminate.
When playing the lottery, for example, winning is a salient possibility and there is
no good reason to eliminate this possibility as opposed to others. This underlies
the ‘normalcy’ theory of relevant alternatives developed in Leplin (2009); Smith
(2010, 2017): while we can safely ignore alternatives which deviate from the ‘nor-
mal’ course of events, other alternatives, such as those left open by statistical
evidence, are simply part of our normal representation of the world and cannot
be eliminated. Another explanation for why statistical evidence is inadmissible
relies on the notion of sensitivity (Enoch et al., 2012), which similarly argues that
the possibility of error is relevant for statistical evidence in a way that it is not
for direct evidence; since sensitivity is also used to respond to the Gettier cases,
this criterion will be discussed in greater depth in §5.
Smith (2010) suggests that justification, and therefore knowledge, deals with
“ceteris paribus laws” rather than “brute statistical generalizations” (10). The
causal modeling framework makes this relationship more precise. In a causal
model, the laws are represented by the structural equations. Laws rarely hold in
7For experimental evidence that people are inclined not to attribute knowledge in lottery
cases and other cases of statistical evidence, see Friedman and Turri (2015) and Ebert et al.
(2018).
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100% of circumstances, and the fact that laws hold ceteris paribus or in normal
circumstances, but not in certain outlier cases, is encoded in the low probability
error terms in the structural equations of the model. Ignoring these error terms
is akin to imposing the ‘all normal’ constraint on the laws. A proposition can
amount to knowledge when the laws of the model guarantee that, in normal
circumstances, the proposition must be true conditional on the evidence.
The causal interpretation of the relevant alternatives theory presented in the
previous section argues that the alternatives we can ignore in epistemic situations
are the alternatives which result from error terms in the structural equations for
the causal model of the situation. As we have seen, this allows direct evidence like
perception and testimony to serve as the basis for knowledge. However, knowledge
cannot be grounded in statistical evidence in the same way. Statistical evidence
is evidence about how frequently an endogenous variable or a combination of
endogenous variables is expected to occur. Since statistical evidence tells us how
likely certain dependent or independent variables are in the model, even if we
ignore the error terms associated with the structural equations in the model, we
can never rule out the values of the variables which the statistical evidence renders
improbable.
This becomes clearer when we consider some examples of statistical evidence
in causal models. First, we consider the Blue Bus case (Wells, 1992; Enoch et al.,
2012). Suppose a bus has caused some damage and one is interested in holding the
appropriate company responsible. If the only information we know is that 80% of
buses in the area are run by the Blue Bus Company, is this sufficient to judge them
responsible? According to Wells (1992), only 8.2% of people support drawing this
conclusion. When the evidence is direct, however, such as testimony from a weight
station attendant claiming that the bus is blue, which is stipulated to have 80%
accuracy, 67.1% of people are willing to hold the company liable. In this example,
direct evidence seems to justify the conclusion, but indirect statistical evidence
does not, even when the direct and statistical evidence are equally accurate.
This case lends itself to similar judgments for knowledge claims. Assuming
the Blue Bus Company is in fact responsible, it seems that believing this on the
basis of the direct testimonial evidence amounts to knowledge, while believe this
on the basis of statistical evidence does not amount to knowledge. We can see how
these predictions arise as a result of the causal version of the relevant alternatives
theory. Consider first the case of direct testimonial evidence. In this case, the
causal model consists of two variables: whether the bus company is the Blue Bus
Company (B) and the whether the attendant testifies that the Blue Bus Company
is responsible (T ). The attendant testimony is based on the observation of the bus,
but with the possibility of error, so the structural equation is T = (B∧¬UT )∨UT .
We know the attendant says the responsible company is the Blue Bus Company, so
T is part of our evidence, and we are interested in whether the Blue Bus Company
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is responsible, B. It is stipulated that Pr(B|T ) = 0.8, so if we assume that UT
and B are mutually exclusive, we get that Pr(UT |T ) = 0.2.8 This means that, if
the cutoff is above 0.2, the error UT is negligible and the belief can amount to
knowledge. The fact that many people consider this inference to be justified and
to amount to knowledge suggests that, for many people, the cutoff is above 0.2.
This contrasts with the case where there is merely statistical evidence that
the Blue Bus Company is responsible. In this case there are no relevant causal
laws; we simply have the variable of interest B and evidence that Pr(B) = 0.8.
Since there are no causal laws, there are no errors which we could consider neg-
ligible. This means that ¬B is always a relevant alternative, so basing the belief
in B on statistical evidence cannot amount to knowledge. This lines up with the
observation that very few people consider the conclusion justified in the situation.
The exact same reasoning applies in the lottery case. Suppose that the lottery
has N tickets, so we can interpret the lottery as a causal model with three vari-
ables: there is a player’s ticket number T ∈ {1, ..., N}, a winning ticket number
W ∈ {1, ..., N}, and a binary outcome O ∈ {0, 1}, which is 1 if the ticket wins
and 0 if the ticket loses. The outcome O is structurally determined by the choice
of ticket T and the winner W , with O = 1 iff T = W and O = 0 otherwise. We
can write the causal graph for the lottery case as follows:
W T
O.
Here, we assume that W and T are both determined exogenously and do not
consider any other possible errors (like the lottery being rigged so that the outcome
is not determined by the chosen winning number).
We are interested in the case where someone has a particular ticket T = t
and is wondering whether that ticket will win or lose. We can take possession of
ticket T = t to be part of the evidence, so that we are interested in the different
possible outcomes conditional on choosing this ticket. We assume that the winner
W is chosen uniformly and independently of which ticket the player holds, so each
ticket is equally likely to win with probability 1N . This means that the odds of
winning, when W = t, are 1N , and the odds of losing are
N−1
N , which is close to 1
when N is high. Even though the ticket will almost certainly lose, it still seems
unjustified to conclude that this will be the case, and even if it will in fact lose,
it seems inappropriate to think that this belief amounts to knowledge. On the
relevant alternatives theory, this is because winning is a salient possibility which
cannot be eliminated from the model, so it is not the case that the ticket will
8The assumption that UT and UB are mutually exclusive rules out the possibility that the
attendant testifies correctly ‘by accident.’ This rules out the possibility of Gettier cases, but is
a plausible simplification.
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lose under all relevant or normal circumstances. On the causal theory, the only
alternatives we are allowed to ignore as irrelevant are those arising from errors in
structural equations, and this model does not consider any such error terms. This
means that all possible winning tickets, or all possible values of W , are relevant
possible situations, no matter how unlikely the situation is. Thus, a person in
this situation cannot discount the possibility of winning, W = t, as irrelevant.
This shows how the causal version of the relevant alternatives theory can ex-
plain the intuition that statistical evidence is insufficient for knowledge, even if
direct evidence which is just as strong can serve as the foundation for knowledge.
While ignoring error variables in the structural equations enables direct evidence
to justify a conclusion, this is not the case for statistical evidence, which usually
shows up as a probabilistic constraint on endogenous variables in the model. This
means that outcomes rendered unlikely by statistical evidence are always rele-
vant possibilities, remaining part of the ‘normal’ representation of the epistemic
situation.
4 Choice of Model and Contextualism
Another feature of the relevant alternatives theory is contextualism, where whether
a belief constitutes knowledge is sensitive to the epistemic context (Cohen, 1999;
Hawthorne, 2004; DeRose, 2009). Contextualism arises naturally in the relevant
alternatives theory because whether an alternative is relevant typically depends
on features of both the agent and the epistemic situation. On the causal inter-
pretation of relevant alternatives, contextualism arises from the fact that one can
describe the same epistemic situation with multiple causal models.
One way contextualism can arise is if two agents disagree about how to un-
derstand an epistemic situation. This kind of contextualism arises frequently in
formal models in epistemology, as there are typically multiple ways to formalize
the same situation. This is not only the case for the relevant alternatives theory,
but also for other formal theories like Leitgeb’s (2014; 2017) stability theory of
belief.9 Leitgeb, for instance, considers two possible ways to formalize the lottery
case, one of which excludes the lottery proposition from knowledge, as above,
and another way which can justify knowledge of the lottery proposition. We can
replicate this second case in the causal modeling framework.
Suppose someone is a lottery pessimist who thinks of the lottery in a deter-
ministic way: when someone chooses to play the lottery, they are simply wasting
money on a losing ticket, though there is a small (but negligible) probability that
the ticket could miraculously win. The lottery pessimist could model the lottery
case using two variables: P for playing the lottery and O for the outcome, which
can be either a win or a loss. The structural equation in this case is O = P ∧UO:
9For a criticism of formal models on this issue, see Staffel (2016).
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someone wins the lottery if they choose to play, P , and an unusual occurrence
leads to them winning, UO. Assuming the lottery is a fair N ticket lottery, the
probability of UO is
1
N , which is likely below the threshold π, meaning that the
belief that the ticket will lose can amount to knowledge. In this case, there is di-
rect evidence for losing the lottery (P , playing the lottery) rather than statistical
evidence and the possibility of winning is part of a structural law rather than a
possible value for an independent variable.
The difficulty here is that there appears to be no empirical grounds for differ-
entiating between the two causal models for the lottery case. Both models make
the same statistical predictions: a given ticket loses with probability N−1N and
wins with probability 1N . The points where the models disagree, such as whether
one can know that a ticket will lose or whether the counterfactual ‘If I were to buy
a lottery ticket, it would lose’ is true, are likely points where a lottery pessimist
and someone adhering to the model from §3 would disagree. Rather than viewing
the possibility of divergent models as a failure of the formal model to make pre-
dictions, we can think of this as an explanation for disagreement about knowledge
claims.10 Thinking of it this way, the causal version of the relevant alternatives
theory provides a formal explication of what it means to know a proposition given
a causal interpretation of an epistemic situation, but does not by itself determine
how situations must be interpreted causally. The fact that it is possible to model
the same situation with different causal models provides a possible explanation
for why disagreement arises and where disagreement stems from.11
Contextualism also arises in cases where a possibility initially deemed irrel-
evant is called to mind or brought up in conversation (Lewis, 1996). Consider
again the case of perceiving a zebra. In this case, it is natural to say that one
knows that there is a zebra on the basis of perception. However, this implies that
various skeptical scenarios do not in fact obtain (for example, that the observed
animal is not a disguised mule), and people are often unwilling to say that we
know these scenarios do not obtain. This means that we can know a proposition
(that there is a zebra), but lack knowledge of a consequence of this proposition
(that the animal which looks like a zebra is not a cleverly disguised mule).
This appears to conflict with the intuition that knowledge is closed: if we
know p, and q follows from p, then we know q.12 We can see that closure holds
for the causal relevant alternatives theory. Since knowledge requires ruling out
all possible alternatives in a normalized causal modelM′, if p is known, p is true
in all worlds in M′ conditional on the evidence E. If p entails q, then all worlds
10Note, however, that this is not the only source of disagreement about knowledge claims.
Two people, for example, can have differing opinions on the correct theory of knowledge.
11For a more detailed discussion of choosing different causal models and how this factors into
disagreement about counterfactuals, see Vandenburgh (2020).
12For a defense and more sophisticated discussion of closure, see Williamson (2002) and
Hawthorne (2005).
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where p is true are worlds where q is true, so q must also be true in all worlds in
M′ conditional on E, meaning q can also be known. The contextualist solution
to this is to argue that, in changing the target proposition from ‘There is a zebra’
to ‘There is not a disguised mule,’ something about the context of the epistemic
situation changes which means that there is no conflict between knowledge of the
first proposition, lack of knowledge of the second proposition, and closure.
This shift in context can be explained naturally using causal models. For
perceiving a zebra, recall that the causal model describing the situation has two
variables, Z for zebra and A for the perceptual appearance of a zebra, with struc-
tural equation A = (Z ∧ ¬U ′A) ∨ UA, where UA is negligible so that Z can be
known on the basis of A. The proposition ‘There is not a disguised mule,’ how-
ever, is not easily formulated in the model. This possibility is incorporated in
the error variable UA, which represents all causes of the appearance of a zebra
other than an actual zebra. However, it does not correspond to the requirement
¬UA, since there can be another cause of a zebra appearance (like a hologram)
which activates UA without there being a disguised mule. Furthermore, the causal
framework requires that the target proposition be a proposition defined in terms
of endogenous variables in the model, and while the original target proposition
‘There is a zebra’ meets this requirement, the proposition ‘There is not a disguised
mule’ does not.
This suggests that, in order to determine whether one can know that there
is not a disguised mule, we need a new causal model of the situation which in-
corporates this specifically in the main variables of the model. In this example,




with structural equation A = (Z ∧ ¬U ′A) ∨M ∨ UA, where UA now represents all
causes of A other than either Z or M . The proposition ‘There is not a disguised
mule’ can now be represented as ¬M . While M has very low probability, this is
now an independent variable in the model and cannot be eliminated by ignoring
error terms from the structural relationships of the model: ignoring UA, for ex-
ample, does not guarantee ¬M . Furthermore, we notice that concluding that a
zebra is present, Z, can no longer amount to knowledge in the new model since
we cannot rule out M as a possible alternative. This shows how a change in the
causal model, or the epistemic context, can lead to a situation where p is known,
p entails q, but q is not known, despite the fact that closure holds in any given
epistemic context.
Note that this is not the only approach to contextualism consistent with the
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causal relevant alternatives theory. It is possible, for example, to argue that
closure fails if one takes the new causal model M′ to depend not only on the
original modelM, the evidence E, and the cutoff π, but also on the proposition p.
This is the strategy used by Dretske (1970) to argue against closure, which can be
formalized in logical representations of the relevant alternatives theory (Holliday,
2015), including the causal representation. Furthermore, the causal interpretation
does not specify the conversational dynamics of epistemic contextualism. It is
possible that there is one correct causal model throughout, so that either both p
and q or neither p nor q amount to knowledge. It is also possible that raising a
new possibility can force the new causal model to be the new baseline, rendering
the initial proposition p retrospectively excluded from knowledge.13 Thus, while
I believe that the version of epistemic contextualism formulated here is most
plausible, where apparent failures of closure result from a change in the epistemic
context (the causal model), other interpretations are consistent with the causal
framework.
5 Gettier Cases
Recall how the Gettier case arose in the zebra example in §2: when considering the
perception of a zebra, it is possible that a zebra is present but not seen (Z ∧U ′A)
and that another cause, like a disguised mule or hologram (UA), makes it look
like there is a zebra present. This has the standard form of a Gettier case, where
a belief is justified and true, but an aspect of the situation makes the belief epis-
temically lucky rather than reliably informed.14 While such Gettier cases often
sound contrived in philosophical discussions, they arise quite naturally in causal
models. As we have seen, a simple causal model of the errors associated with
perception already includes the possibility for Gettier cases without the need for
any modification. Gettier-like cases also arise in causal reasoning in epidemiol-
ogy, as seen in the calculation of the attributable fraction (Rosen, 2013), which
measures the fraction of disease cases which are attributable to a certain cause.
For example, smoking or other risk factors may justify believing that someone
will develop lung cancer, but just because that person develops lung cancer does
not mean that the disease is attributable to the risk factor: it is possible, and im-
portant to consider, that other background conditions could instead be the cause
of the disease. When other background conditions are at play, a prediction that
someone will get a disease can be true and justified by risk factors, but fail to
amount to knowledge.
As discussed in §2, Gettier cases for perception are ruled out from knowledge
by the causal relevant alternatives theory. This is because, when eliminating error
13See the discussion in Rysiew (2016) and the account of Blome-Tillmann (2009).
14On epistemic luck, see Pritchard (2005).
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terms to form the set of relevant alternatives inM′, we impose the constraint that
we do not eliminate any error terms Ui = ui which obtain in the actual world w.
We have seen how this condition rules out the Gettier case when perceiving a
zebra. The Gettier case arises in world (UZ , U
′
A, UA), where something other
than a zebra causes the appearance of a zebra (UA) and there is actually a zebra
(UZ), but the zebra is not seen (U
′
A). In this case, since UA obtains in the actual
world, we must include the error term in the set of relevant possibilities, so the
world (¬UZ , U ′A, UA) is a relevant possibility in which Z is false, meaning that one
cannot know Z in this world.
We can view this as a formal version of Lewis’s argument that the relevant
alternatives theory rules out Gettier cases. For Lewis (1996), this follows from two
rules about which alternatives can be ruled out in an epistemic context: the Rule
of Actuality states that the alternative of actuality can never be ruled out and the
Rule of Resemblance states that if one alternative resembles another alternative
which cannot be ignored, then neither alternative can be ignored. On the causal
interpretation, error terms which are realized in actuality cannot be ignored (Rule
of Actuality), so other worlds cannot be ruled out on the basis of this error term
(Rule of Resemblance).15
We can also note that Zagzebski’s (1994) argument about the inescapability of
Gettier problems does not apply to the causal theory. This is because Zagzebski’s
argument does not apply to conditions which entail truth: if a condition required
for knowing p entails the truth of p, the condition can ensure that no actualized
errors are ruled out. We can see that the condition on knowledge given here
entails truth: since no error terms Ui = ui from the actual world w can be ruled
out from the set of relevant alternatives, w itself is a relevant alternative, and
since p must be true in all relevant alternatives, p must be true in w.
We can also compare the causal analysis of knowledge to some other propos-
als for resolving Gettier cases. Another causal approach to knowledge (Goldman,
1967; Dretske, 1981) proposes that knowledge requires a causal connection be-
tween the proposition believed and the world itself. This differs from the approach
here, which involves the causal alternatives to a proposition given background ev-
idence rather than a causal connection between the belief and the world. The
difference can be illustrated by considering the barn facade case, where someone
comes across a field of many fake barns and one real barn and, luckily, points to the
only real barn and exclaims ‘That’s a barn!’ (Ichikawa and Steup, 2018). While
this belief is true and justified, it is generally taken to not constitute knowledge
due to the high likelihood of error involved in the judgment that a given barn ap-
pearance is a barn in the context. While the causal approach following Goldman
15Note that the causal interpretation does not face the issues with speaker sensitivity which
Cohen (1998) attributes to Lewis’s response to the Gettier cases, making Cohen’s objection to
this treatment inapplicable.
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takes this to constitute knowledge since the belief that there is a barn is caused
by a real barn in the world, the approach here can explain why this would not
constitute knowledge: in this context, the error variable which represents some-
thing other than a real barn causing a barn-appearance has high probability and
cannot be eliminated.16
Another condition on knowledge, safety (Sosa, 1999), imposes a constraint
on a set of nearby worlds, as we did for the set of worlds in M′. The safety
constraint requires that, in nearby worlds where one believes p, p is not false.
This constraint can explain many Gettier cases: in the perception case, the set
of nearby worlds to (UZ , U
′
A, UA) includes the world where there is no zebra, but
the zebra appearance is still there, so one believes that there is a zebra, but this
is false, violating the safety constraint. A similar constraint, sensitivity (Nozick,
1981; DeRose, 1995), requires that, in the closest worlds where p is not the case,
one would not believe p. This can also rule out many Gettier cases: the nearby
world where there is a zebra appearance but no zebra, for example, also violates
the sensitivity constraint.
A criticism of both safety and sensitivity is that they do not make precise
which worlds are ‘nearby’ to the actual world. Williamson (2009), for example,
claims that one would not be able to verify the safety condition without a prior
understanding of knowledge. Similarly, how this account compares to that of
safety or sensitivity depends on how the nearby worlds are identified. If, given
a causal model M and a world w, we assume that the set of nearby worlds to
w is the set of worlds in M′, then the condition for knowledge proposed here is
equivalent to safety, provided belief arises completely in response to the evidence
E. In this case, believing p on the basis of E is safe iff E entails p in M′, which
is equivalent to the requirement that p is true in all worlds in M′ conditional
on the evidence E, the condition for knowledge given here.17 Sensitivity, on the
other hand, offers a stronger constraint: if p is sensitive, then all of the nearest
¬p worlds must be ¬E worlds. This entails that none of the nearby E worlds
in M′ can be ¬p worlds, which is the safety criterion, but if safety holds, then
the sensitivity constraint requires a further condition on the nearest ¬p worlds
outside ofM′. Thus, while it is difficult to determine what conditions safety and
sensitivity impose without a more complete discussion of the set of relevant nearby
worlds, we see that if the nearby relevant worlds are those in M′, the condition
16The verdict in this case depends on whether one takes the probability of error to be local,
determined by the nearby barn facades, or global, determined by the accuracy of identifying barns
based on their appearances in general. In the former case, the proposition does not amount to
knowledge, while in the latter case, it does. This provides another illustration of the importance
of model selection, discussed in §4.
17Note that there are some criticisms of safety as a response to Gettier cases. See, for example,
Comesaña (2005) and Hiller and Neta (2007). I will not discuss these critiques or possible
responses in this paper.
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for knowledge imposed here is equivalent to safety, but a weaker condition than
sensitivity.
6 Future Directions: Justification, Full Belief, and
Graded Justification
So far, we have only discussed how the causal interpretation of the relevant al-
ternatives theory can be applied to the theory of knowledge, explaining why sta-
tistical evidence is insufficient for knowledge, how epistemic contextualism arises,
and why Gettier cases are excluded from knowledge. However, the relevant al-
ternatives theory can also play a role in exploring other epistemic concepts like
justification (Smith, 2010, 2017; Leplin, 2009) and full belief (Clarke, 2013; Greco,
2015). In this section, I provide some tentative proposals for extending the the-
ory to justification and full belief, as well as to a graded measure of the degree of
justification.
A motivation for theorizing about justification and full belief using relevant
alternatives is that these epistemic concepts are often thought to satisfy some of
the same properties as knowledge. Basing justification or full belief on statistical
evidence, for example, seems inappropriate: it seems that one is not justified in
believing that a lottery ticket will lose just on the basis of statistical evidence
(Smith, Forthcoming) and it would be odd for someone to fully believe this, espe-
cially if they act on this belief by throwing out the lottery ticket.18 Furthermore,
the intuition from epistemic contextualism seems to carry over to justification and
full belief: while one is perfectly justified in fully believing that there is a zebra
on the basis of the perceptual appearance of a zebra, it seems that one is less
justified in believing that the appearance is not the result of a clever disguise.
This motivates the relevant alternatives theories of justification and full belief:
an agent is justified in believing p, or an agent fully believes p, iff p is true in all
relevant alternatives considered by the agent.
While this has a similar setup as the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge,
justification and full belief differ substantially from knowledge; one can be justified
in fully believing a false proposition and Gettier beliefs are justified and fully
believed, but are excluded from knowledge. This means that a different set of
relevant alternatives must be used for justification and full belief than is used for
knowledge. Recall the setup for the causal approach to knowledge: there is a
causal model M which includes all possible causal alternatives, a proposition of
interest p, and a body of evidence E. For p to count as knowledge, p must be true
in all worlds in the ‘normalized’ model M′, where M′ is produced from M by
18Note, however, that the experimental evidence in Friedman and Turri (2015) and Ebert et al.
(2018) suggests that many people are willing to consider beliefs based on statistical evidence
justified.
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eliminating all error terms which are sufficiently improbable and not activated in
the actual world. For justification and full belief, the second condition requiring
that we can only ignore non-actual error terms is too strong: as we saw above,
this condition guarantees truth and rules out Gettier cases.
A plausible interpretation of justification and full belief in the relevant alter-
natives theory is that the set of relevant alternatives, M̃, is formed by eliminating
all low probability error terms regardless of their status in actuality. Thus, given
a full causal model M, we form the set of relevant alternatives M̃ by elimi-
nating the error terms which are sufficiently improbable, eliminating Ui = ui if
Pr(Ui = ui|E) < π. We note that this formulation of justification and full belief,
unlike knowledge, does not guarantee truth: it is possible that the actual world w
contains a low probability error term which is eliminated from M̃. Furthermore,
we see that the formulation of knowledge from §2 entails justification and full
belief: all worlds in M̃ are also worlds inM′, so if p is true in every world inM′,
p is also true in every world in M̃. This formulation of the relevant alternatives
theory of justification and full belief is sufficient to rule out statistical evidence
and address contextualism. Since only error terms can be ignored, statistical evi-
dence about endogenous variables is not sufficient for justification and full belief,
as in §3, and a proposition can change justification or belief status depending on
which variables are made endogenous rather than included in error terms, as in
§4.
Note that, like knowledge, full belief and justification are relative to a model
M, and whether this model is taken to be subjective or objective is significant
for the application of the theory. Recall from §2 that, for knowledge, we assumed
thatM represents both the agent’s beliefs and the true causal model in the actual
world. This makes sense given that knowledge requires a correct correspondence
between the subjective and the objective, but this condition is not necessarily the
most sensible for justification and full belief. If we assume that the causal model
M and the associated probability distribution Pr are entirely subjective, with no
further requirement that the model is accurate or reasonable, we get a completely
internalist conception of justification: a belief can be justified or fully believed by
someone relative to their model, even if this model has epistemic flaws. On the
other hand, requiring that the subjective model match reality, as with knowledge,
ensures that justification is connected with truth and that the justification holds
up relative to reality, providing an externalist conception of justification.19
One could also formulate a notion of the degree to which a proposition is
justified using the causal theory presented here. A popular approach to this
problem associates confidence in p with the conditional probability Pr(p|E). When
this is applied to an agent’s degree of belief, this is known as the Lockean thesis
(Foley, 1992; Dorst, 2019), and when applied to the degree of justification, this is
19On internalism and externalism, see Kornblith (2001).
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a view Smith (2010; 2017) calls the risk minimization theory. However, this purely
probabilistic approach faces some problems: the account predicts that the lottery
proposition, and other propositions justified by statistical evidence, have a high
degree of justification (Smith, 2010) and the account fails to explain why many
propositions with intermediate likelihoods are ‘completely unjustified’, implying
a degree of justification or belief of zero (Hawthorne and Logins, 2020).
The causal theory can be used to formulate a graded notion of justification
which addresses these issues. Whether a proposition is known at a world defines a
proposition over the set of worlds in the causal modelM: p is known in world w,
written K(p, w) = 1, iff the condition for knowledge discussed in §2 is met relative
to the model M with probability distribution Pr, world w, and body of evidence
E. Otherwise, p is not known in w, written K(p, w) = 0. Since the model M
includes a set of possible worlds U and Pr(−|E) defines a probability distribution





It seems reasonable to suggest that the degree to which someone takes p to be jus-
tified tracks their estimation for the likelihood that they know p, here represented
by K(p).
In many cases, K(p) approximates the conditional probability Pr(p|E). Con-
sider a simple case where the proposition of interest p has a causal effect on some
evidence e ∈ E, as is the case for perception and testimony. Assume other causes
of e are represented by the error term Ue, that p and Ue are mutually exclusive,
and that Ue falls below the probability cutoff, Pr(Ue|E) < π. In this case, it is
justified to believe p given the evidence E, and one knows p in all worlds where
Ue is not activated, or in all worlds where p is true. Since K(p, w) is true in all
worlds where p is true and false in all worlds where p is false, K(p) = Pr(p|E). In
general, however, K(p) will fall below Pr(p|E) with the addition of Gettier cases
and other confounding variables. K(p) is also often zero: whenever p is unjustified
in the situation, so one of the error terms does not meet the cutoff, p won’t be
known in any world, so K(p) = 0. This applies, for example, to cases of statistical
evidence like the lottery proposition.21
This section shows how the causal version of the relevant alternatives theory
could be extended to provide a reasonable theory of justification, full belief, and
the degree of justification. While more work is necessary to understand the details
of these proposals and how they compare to alternatives, this shows that the
20Note that this is a standard way of calculating the probability of a proposition in a proba-
bilistic setting; see Yalcin (2010).
21This proposal has some features in common with other theories of the degree of justification,
like Shogenji (2012), but further research is required to better understand the desired properties
of such a measure.
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causal relevant alternatives theory can be applied to epistemic problems beyond
the analysis of knowledge.
7 Conclusion
This paper uses causal models to develop a formal framework for the relevant
alternatives theory of knowledge. On this theory, a proposition is known only
if it is true in all relevant alternatives, where the set of relevant alternatives is
determined by a causal model of the epistemic situation. In particular, the set
of relevant alternatives is formed by ignoring all error terms in the causal model
which are sufficiently improbable and not realized in the actual world. This theory
explains why statistical evidence is insufficient for knowledge, allows for a simple
formulation of epistemic contextualism, and explains why Gettier cases are ruled
out from knowledge. The causal theory also shows promise for handling other
epistemic notions like justification, full belief, and degrees of justification/belief.
Formulating the relevant alternatives theory in terms of causal models makes the
predictions of the theory clearer and more precise, strengthening the case for it
as a theory of knowledge.
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